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From at least two months onwards, infants can form perceptual categories.
During the first year of life, object knowledge develops from the ability to
represent individual object features to representing correlations between
attributes and to integrate information from different sources. At the end of
the first year, these representations are shaped by labels, opening the way
to conceptual knowledge. Here, we review the development of object know-
ledge and object categorization over the first year of life. We then present an
artificial neural network model that models the transition from early percep-
tual categorization to categories mediated by labels. The model informs a
current debate on the role of labels in object categorization by suggesting
that although labels do not act as object features they nevertheless affect per-
ceived similarity of perceptually distinct objects sharing the same label. The
model presents the first step of an integrated account from early perceptual
categorization to language-based concept learning.
1. Introduction
During their first 2 years of life, infantsmove from the vast array of seemingly dis-
connected sensory experiences towards a sophisticated knowledge of objects,
people and events, including the ability to group perceptually different objects
into common categories, and to understand and produce the names for many
of them [1,2]. Two closely related areas of research have addressed infants’ devel-
oping knowledge about individual objects, and the ability to form object
categories, respectively. Research on object knowledge has investigated the pro-
gressive increase in the complexity of infants’ representation of objects, for
example the developing ability to encode correlations between object features,
and the ability to link information from different sensory domains. Work on
object categorization has asked how infants group perceptually distinct objects
together and how the basis for these categories changes across development.
Research on early word learning has likewise proceeded along separate
strands. One strand, usually concerned with infants and toddlers from 14
months of age, has focused on when and how words are learned, how they are
linked to objects, how they are used and extended to novel objects and how
knowledge of a label affects children’s inferences about an object’s hidden prop-
erties. A second strand, usually focusing on younger infants around 10–12
months of age, addresses the question of how labels affect infants’ categorization
of objects that share the same label or that are labelled differently.
A coherent account of early semantic development should encompass all of
these research fields. Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that, while
many studies test infants’ abilities to acquire object knowledge in laboratory-
based experimental settings, the knowledge shown by infants in such settings
arises from an interaction between what was learned in the laboratory and
prior knowledge acquired outside the laboratory. In this paper, we aim to pre-
sent a first step towards an integrated account of semantic development in the
form of a computer model that accounts for phenomena in early prelinguistic
categorization as well as for the role of word learning on category structures.
Computational models are useful tools for developing and testing hypotheses
of the mechanisms underlying development and for linking individual
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observations of developmental abilities into a coherent
trajectory of developmental change [3–5].
In the rest of this paper, we first review the development of
object knowledge and categorization, characterizing both as
shaped by a progressive development in the ability to integrate
aspects of information leading to the enrichment of category
representations. In the second part of the paper, we then pre-
sent a computational model that has previously been used to
account for apparently contradictory results in early object cat-
egorization, and we enhance it to account for the transition
from prelinguistic to language-mediated object categorization.
2. The development of object categorization
The ability to categorize lies at the heart of semantic develop-
ment. Knowledge of categories not only carves up the world
in meaningful ways, but it also enables us to infer and predict
properties of newly encountered objects. For example, by
possessing the category ‘dog’ and being able to recognize a
never before seen animal as a member of this category, we
know to expect that it makes barking sounds, chases after
cars and may come to lick our hand while wagging its tail.
We are also able to name this new animal as ‘dog’.
Given its importance for cognition as a whole, over the past
30 years a considerable amount of research has been devoted
to the development of categorization in infancy. Much of this
work is based on the familiarization/novelty-preference pro-
cedure that examines infants’ abilities to rapidly form
categories in laboratory-based settings. This method relies on
the fact that infants tend to spend more time looking towards
novel than towards familiar stimuli. In a typical categorization
study, infants are familiarized to a sequence of objects from a
single category and are then tested with two new objects, one
from the familiarized category and one from a different
category. When infants show a looking preference to the
object from the new category it can be concluded that during
familiarization they have formed a category that includes the
new within-category object but excludes the object from
the different category. For example, in a seminal study that
examined the earliest perceptual categories, Quinn et al. [6]
familiarized three- to four-month-old infants on a sequence of
cat pictures and found that in the test phase they looked
longer at pictures of dogs, horses and humans than at pictures
of novel cats. This and related work has shown that infants as
young as two months can form perceptual categories for
many objects at both the basic (e.g. dogs, cats, chairs, couches)
and global levels (e.g. animals, vehicles, furniture) [7–11],
although global-level categories typically precede basic-level
categories when compared directly [1,2,12–15].
Subsequent work has verified that the way in which these
early categories are formed is contingent on the specific percep-
tual properties of the stimuli and even on the order in which
they are presented during familiarization [16–20]. It has also
become clear that previous experience interacts with the stimuli
presented during testing in the laboratory. For example,
Kovack-Lesh et al. [17] found that four-month-olds’ category
formation for cats and dogs was affected by whether they
had these pets at home or not.
Otherwork has shown that infants extract information about
category prototypes from the images used during familiariz-
ation. For example, when trained on distorted triangles three-
to four-month-old infants subsequently treated a prototypical
(equilateral) triangle as more familiar than previously seen
atypical triangles [21]. For more complex shapes only seven-
month-olds showed the same effect [22]. However, the higher
familiarity of a prototype after familiarization exists in parallel
with item memory for atypical category members [23].
With increasedage, infants’ ability toprocessobjects becomes
progressively more sophisticated, with a developing sensitivity
to the correlations between object features between seven and
10 months of age. For example, Younger & Cohen [24] familiar-
ized infants on two animal line drawings where each animal
had a characteristic body shape, tail and feet. Infants were then
tested on a previously seen animal, a completely novel animal
and an animal thatwas composed of a novel combination of pre-
viously seen features (e.g. the body and feet of the first animal
with the tail of the second animal). Younger and Cohen found
that four-month-old infants did not look longer at this animal
than at one they had seen during familiarization. By contrast,
seven-month-olds looked at this new animal as long as at the
animal made from completely novel features. When only two
out of the three features were correlated, only 10-month-olds
were sensitive to violations of feature correlations, suggesting a
progressively developing sensitivity to feature correlations.
From the second half of their first year of life, infants become
able to integrate different object features such as visual appear-
ance, sounds, function and motion [25–27]. For example,
although infants are sensitive to biological motion information
from birth [28] and three-month-olds can discriminate familiar
and novel motion paths even after a delay of one month [29],
the ability to linkmotion information with static visual features
seems to arise later in development [1,2]. In fact, in one study
[30], objectmovementwas found to interferewith infants’ learn-
ing of shape–colour compounds up to the age of 10 months.
More global features indicating animacy such as eyes and
fur, on the other hand, were linked to animate-like motion in
seven-month-old infants [31], perhaps indicating that real-
world experiences with a richer stimulus set enables learning
of such associations earlier than found in the laboratory.
In a study by Madole et al. [25] on object function, 14-
month-olds were sensitive to an object’s change in function,
but only by 18 months were infants able to link function
with an object’s static visual features. However, in other
studies 11- to 12-month-olds already detected the functional
relevance of object parts and categorized objects based on
these parts when the function had been demonstrated to
them [27], again providing evidence for a developing ability
to integrate different aspects of an object and an earlier devel-
opment of this ability under more ecologically valid
conditions. In a related study, it was found that 10-month-
olds were able to learn the relationship between an object’s
visual appearance and its function, but not between visual
appearance and sound or between function and sound [26].
In a recent study investigating infants’ ability to learn
complex crossmodal associations, Chen & Westermann [32]
familiarized 10- and 12-month-old infants on two animated car-
toon animals, each of which produced a characteristic
unfamiliar sound. At test, both animals were shown side-by-
side and one of the sounds was played. Twelve-month-olds,
but not 10-month-olds, looked longer at the animal associated
with the played sound, indicating that the ability to rapidly
link novel objects and semantically meaningful sounds arises
around 12 months of age.
Together, the described work suggests an unfolding ability
of infants to learn about different aspects of objects and
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associate different static and dynamic features to form a com-
plete object representation. In this way, categories in infancy
are based on progressively enriched representations that inte-
grate information from multiple sources, starting with the
ability to represent individual object properties and followed
by the ability to integrate these properties to form more
complex representations and to detect correlations between
features in one or across several sensory domains (see also [33]).
3. Word learning and categorization
In the second half of their first year, infants begin to learn
their first words. From six months onwards, they look at
the referent for some familiar nouns when spoken by their
parent [34], and there is neurophysiological evidence that
this understanding is referential by nine months of age [35].
In laboratory studies, infants from 13 months onwards can
learn to associate novel labels with novel objects after a few
familiarization trials [36]. A number of studies have asked
how this emerging language affects category formation.
There has been considerable debate on how early word and
category learning interact. Early work by Waxman & co-
workers [37–39] argued that labels act as ‘invitations to
form categories’ by highlighting the common features of
objects sharing a label. In several studies, infants from six
to 15 months of age were familiarized on one category
(e.g. dinosaurs) while either hearing a labelling phrase
(‘Look, it’s a toma!’), a non-labelling phrase (‘Look at this!’)
or a tone sequence. At test, only infants who had heard the
labelling phrase looked longer at an out-of-category item
(e.g. a fish) than at a novel within-category item. However,
since other studies described above had found that infants
can already form perceptual categories when viewing objects
in silence, it is unclear what additional role the labels played
in these studies. An alternative account of these results was
therefore provided by Robinson & Sloutsky [40,41], who
argued that auditory information interferes with the pro-
cessing of visual information but that familiar sounds such
as labels disrupted visual processing less than unfamiliar
sounds such as tone sequences. Nevertheless, more recent
work involving a silent control condition has shown that
labels can indeed override visual similarities and re-shape
categories to correspond to how objects are labelled [42,43].
In one study [42], 10-month-old infants were familiarized
on a continuum of eight morphed cartoon animals. Looking
times at test revealed that when the stimuli were presented
in silence or with a single common label, infants formed a
large category comprising all eight stimuli. However, when
half of the animals were labelled with one name and the
other half with another, infants separated the animals into
two categories according to the labels.
There has also been substantial debate over how labels
affect perceived similarity in development, linked to the
role that labels play in object categorization. One view
holds that labels from early on act as category markers that
stand as a placeholder for a concept and enable language-
based inference of deeper conceptual structure [39,44,45].
A different view argues that early labels are merely another
object feature in line with, for example, visual perceptual
properties, and that shared labels contribute to the overall
similarity between objects with the same (or indeed, similar)
labels [46–50]. These two views make contrasting predictions
about the interactions between visual properties and labels:
according to the label-as-feature view, but not the label-
as-category-marker view, shared labels should affect
similarity judgements between items.
Circumstantial evidence for the label-as-feature view
comes from a series of studies by Sloutsky and co-workers
[47–50], but see [51,52]. For example, Sloutsky & Fisher
[47] presented 4- to 5-year-old children (much older than
the infants discussed so far) with picture triads containing
a target item and two test options (A and B). Test option A
was perceptually more similar to the target than option
B. However, when target and test option B shared a label,
the children judged B as more similar to the target than A.
In sum, it has become clear that labels can affect early cat-
egories by aligning category boundaries with shared labels. It
also seems to be the case that shared labels affect perceived
similarity of objects. However, whether labels act on the
same level as visual object features or whether they are sep-
arate from visual features and act on perceptual object
representations as a whole is an unresolved question.
4. A dual-memory model of infant
categorization
As described above, many studies using the familiarization/
novelty-preference procedure have found that infants can
form perceptual categories at least from two months of
age, and that the level of categories—basic or global—is
dependent on the similarity between the specific stimuli. How-
ever, other methods that do not involve familiarization but
instead assess spontaneous categorization to tap into infants’
background knowledge have often yielded quite different
results [8,14]. For example, in the sequential touching para-
digm, a set of toy objects from different categories is placed
in front of the infant. The order in which the infant touches
the toys is recorded, and above-chance touching of objects
from one category is taken as evidence that the infant has cate-
gorized the objects. Using this procedure, it was found that 12-
to 20-month-olds formed categories on the global level, and
that basic-level distinctions within a global category were not
made before 20 or even 30 months of age [53–55]. Similar
results were found using the generalized imitation technique
[56,57]. In this method, a certain action is modelled for the
infant with a toy figure, for example, giving a dog a cup of
liquid to drink. Infants are then asked to perform the same
action with different toys, such as another dog, a cat or a
plane. Categorization is assessed by the new toys to which
the infant is extending the modelled action. It was found
that 14-month-olds successfully generalized the actions to
members of the same category (animals or vehicles). These
results were taken as evidence that categorization is not tied
to perceptual properties of objects but that it is based on con-
ceptual knowledge and that infants generalized the modelled
action to members of the same category (e.g. for a dog, another
dog or a cat), rather than of the same appearance.
Given the different results from familiarization-based and
non-familiarization-based studies, there has been intense
debate on whether deeper concepts arise from perceptual cat-
egories through a process of enrichment [9,58,59], or whether
perceptual categorization and concept learning are separate
processes [8,60,61] or indeed, whether early perceptual pro-
cesses are already based on conceptual object analysis [14].
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We [62] presented a connectionist neural network model of
infant categorization that aimed to integrate the different
results from looking-time and sequential-touching/general-
ized-imitation-type studies. The model was based on the
idea that a coherent account of this body of work could be
provided by considering the unfolding interactions between
two developing memory systems in the brain. In the adult
literature, the view that memory formation and consolidation
depend on multiple interacting neural systems is widely
accepted [63,64]. One influential idea [64] is that whereas
the hippocampus is responsible for rapidly acquiring new
memories, cortical networks learn slowly and extract regu-
larities from the environment. Our model was inspired by
this distinction between hippocampal and cortical processing.
Furthermore, it was based on the developmental literature
which suggests that novelty preferences observed in infant
looking-time studies are driven by the hippocampal memory
system [65,66], whereas categorization behaviour displa-
yed in imitation and object examination studies depends on
a later-maturing memory network that involves inferior
temporal regions [65]. The fact that different experimental
methods tap into different memory representations can
explain why the results in infant categorization depend on
the methodology used.
Consequently, the model consisted of two interacting
components (figure 1): a fast-learning hippocampal/striatal
system and a slower learning cortical system. Each component
consisted of an auto-encoder neural network: a three-layer
network that receives the representation of an object as input
and that learns to recreate the input on the output side. Because
the hidden layer is smaller than input and output layers this
creates a bottleneck, forcing the network to extract regularities
from the input to solve this task. Single auto-encoder models
have previously been used to model looking-time data in
infant categorization [16,67–70].
In the dual-memory model (see appendix A for implemen-
tation details) the hippocampal system was used to simulate
looking times in experimental situations where categories are
formed online in a familiarization/novelty-preference study.
The cortical component modelled the gradual develop-
ment of representations that drive non-familiarization-based
responses. The two systems differed only in their learning
rate, that is, the rate at which weights were adapted in response
to exposure to objects, with the hippocampal system adapting its
connection weights at a higher rate than the cortical system.
Interactions between the components were modelled by connec-
tions between the subsystems’ hidden layers. Together these
architectural constraints embody a minimal set of assumptions
about how the dual-memory systems can interact.
The model was trained in two ways. In background training
objects were randomly presented to the model for random
amounts of time. This training aimed to simulate infants’
experiences with objects in the real world. Modelling of cat-
egory formation in familiarization studies was achieved
through familiarization training where sequences of related
stimuli were presented for fixed amounts of time. Looking
times were modelled by the output of the hippocampal com-
ponent: the more different the output was from the input, the
longer the looking time at the stimulus [67]. Developing cor-
tical representations were modelled by the activation patterns
in the hidden layer of the cortical system.
The model was able to account for a range of results from
infant category learning: in its cortical component, it learned
perceptual categories that became progressively differentiated
with increased exposure to exemplars, showing the global-
to-basic shift that is also found in infant categories. The model
could further account for the fact that background experience
affects infants’ looking behaviour in an experimental setting
[71]. This was because previously learned representations in
the cortical system facilitated online category learning of related
items in the hippocampal component through feedback connec-
tions. More recently, we used the output of the cortical system
to model infant event-related potential (ERP) data in early
object categorization [72].
In sum, the model covered a range of phenomena from
early, prelinguistic object categorization, accounting for
data from different experimental paradigms and data from be-
havioural and neurophysiological studies. Here, we want to
extend this model to simulate the shift from prelinguistic
to language-mediated categorization.
The extended model had the same architecture as the
original one, but in order to model the transition from pre-
linguistic perceptual categorization to language-mediated
categorization we extended the model with task/label units
linked to the hidden layer of the cortical memory system
(figure 1). The idea here was that these units could potentially
encode a variety of functions and object properties that go
beyond perceptual feature information, such as representing
affordances and specific ways of interacting with an object
or knowledge of an object’s hidden properties. Because we
aimed to model the role of first words in object categorization
here these units were used to encode object labels both at the
basic and global levels of categorization.
5. Stimuli
In order to model the development of basic- and global-level
categories under varying labelling conditions, eight photo-
graphs each of objects from 26 basic-level categories
were chosen. The basic-level object categories were (human)
male, (human) female, dog, cat, rabbit, horse, elephant, giraffe,
cow, squirrel, fish, eagle, songbird, duck, bicycle, forklift, bus,
car, plane, ship, desk, table, bed, sofa, chest of drawers and
chair. They fell into the four global-level categories humans,
animals, vehicles and furniture that have all been previously
used to test infant category formation. Exemplars varied in
their within-category perceptual similarities (see appendix A).
Each of the 208 objects was represented by 18 general (geo-
metric) and object-specific (facial) features: maximal height,
minimal height, maximal width, minimal width of base,
number of protrusions, maximal length/width of left, right,
input 
target = input target = input 
task/label units 
‘cortical’
system
‘hippocampal’
system
Figure 1. Schema of the dual-memory model.
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lowerandupper protrusion,minimalwidth of lower protrusion,
texture, eye separation, face length and face width. Feature
values were scaled between 0 and 1. For each basic-level cat-
egory, a prototypical object (not included in the training set)
was created byaveraging the feature values of all of itsmembers.
In order to simulate an infant’s general experience with
the world, objects were presented in background training to
the model in random order for random exposure lengths
(between 1 and 1000 epochs). In simulations that explored the
effect of labelling, each object had a 50% chance of being
labelled, either with a global-level or a basic-level label (depend-
ing on the simulation). In these cases, the object label was
presented on the task layer and connections from the hidden
layer to the task layer were updated. Thereby, through training,
the labels led to adjustment of the connections from the hidden
to the task units.When no labelwas presented these connections
were not updated. In the simulations reported here, each object
label was represented by a single unit on the task layer. Training
the model on an object proceeded as follows (for details, see
appendixA): the objectwas presented to the input layer and acti-
vation propagated to the hidden layers. Activation then flowed
between the hidden layers until they settled in a stable state.
Next, hidden activations flowed to the output and, if applicable,
task layers. Output values were compared with target values
(the input values for the output layers and the correct label for
the task layer) and all weights were updated using the
backpropagation rule [73]. Weights were updated at each
presentation of an object (online learning).
6. Results
(a) Modelling the effects of labels on object
representations
The first simulation explored the effect on object represen-
tations when labelling objects with their global-level label
(human, vehicle, animal, furniture). Figure 2 shows the
hidden representations in the cortical system without (a)
and with (b) labelling of global categories. This is a projection
of the activation patterns for each category prototype of the
15 hidden units onto two dimensions using principal com-
ponent analysis. When the objects were not labelled, the
representations clustered on the basis of the objects’ percep-
tual similarities that sometimes corresponded to global-level
categories (see also [62]): a cluster for mammals comprised
cats, dogs, cows, elephants, horses and rabbits; a furniture
cluster contained tables, desks, chairs and chests of drawers;
fishes were distant from other objects but were closest to the
mammals cluster. Idiosyncratic clusters such as that of plane,
bicycle and eagle can be explained by the perceptual proper-
ties of these objects: in this case, each had two long, thin
protrusions, wings and handlebars.
When the objects were labelled with their global-level
category name (human, animal, vehicle, furniture), the inter-
nal object representations in the model were modified to
separate clearly along these categories. Learning the objects’
global-level labels therefore warped the cortical repre-
sentational space to reflect both perceptual similarity and the
membership in different global categories. (Note that we
used global-level names here for illustrative purposes to
show the separation into global-level categories; infants are
more likely to hear basic-level than global-level names.)
This initial result models an interaction between per-
ceptual and language-mediated categorization: labels act on
the perceptual similarity structure and warp the similarity
space so that it corresponds to the labelled categories while
still maintaining internal category structure. The model there-
fore predicts that objects sharing the same label will develop
more similar representations, and thus, also be perceived
as more similar. Although this result has received empirical
backing [48] our model offers a different explanation to the
one in the literature. As described above, a long-standing
debate on this issue has yielded two conflicting accounts
[47,49,51,52]: according to the label-as-feature hypothesis, a
category name is merely another object feature on the same
level as visual perceptual features. On this view, common
labels affect the perception of overall similarity between mem-
bers of a category because a shared label-feature increases the
overlap between their representations. By contrast, the knowl-
edge-based view of labels maintains that labels act as markers
for objects and do not affect perceived similarity. In attaching
the label on the output side of the model, the model presented
here takes a middle ground between these two accounts. Here,
the label is not merely a feature of the same kind as, for
example, geometric extent of the object (as it is not an
additional input feature). Instead the model learns a mapping
1.5
sofa
plane
forklift
bedship
bus
car
chest
chair
desk
table
duck
duck
eagle
fish
cow
sbird
sbird
giraffe
giraffe
squirrel
squirrel
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dog
dog
elephant
elephant
cat
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male
female
male
female
chair
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sofa
table
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bike plane
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bus
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bike
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0
–0.5
0.5 1.0
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–0.2
–0.4
–0.4
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1.5 2.0 2.5
(b)
(a)
Figure 2. Cortical hidden layer representations of the category prototypes with-
out labelling (a) and when labelled with global-level labels (b). The figures
represent the projections of the different classes of objects onto the subspace
defined by the first two principal components of the cortical hidden unit space.
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between the perceptual features and the label. In this sense, the
label is a concept marker and each of the members of the cat-
egory evoke the label (see [74] for evidence that infants
implicitly name visually fixated objects). However, differing
from the knowledge-based approach, the model suggests
that, to achieve this mapping, the perceptual representations
of the objects are nevertheless modified and the perceptual
space is warped as a consequence. Therefore, objects sharing
the same label do not become more similar by virtue of
merely sharing another common input feature, but because
perceptual representations must be re-structured in a way
that allows for the mapping between perceptual features and
labels to be learned. This re-representation results in a non-
linear warping of the visual similarity space that maintains to
some degree the topological relationship between the appear-
ances of objects but reduces intra-category distance by
moving objects closer to the category prototype.
(b) Effect of word knowledge on object familiarization
In [62], we showed that, in agreement with empirical
research, the model predicted faster familiarization for objects
with which infants have had prior experience. Here, we
investigated whether the model also predicts that knowledge
of the label for a category facilitates familiarization over and
above prior experience with the objects. For such background
knowledge to have an effect on familiarization time, rep-
resentations from the cortical component have to interact
with the hippocampal representations when familiarization
stimuli are presented. Depending on the developed structure
of cortical representations, these could affect hippocampal
processing in different ways.
We trained three models in different environments. The
first model was not given experience with any background
knowledge. The second model, replicating the results
reported in [62], was trained on all objects from the 26 cat-
egories, but only two of the eight rabbits were used, and
no object was labelled. The third model was trained like the
second, but this time there was a 50% chance for each
object to be labelled with its basic-level name. After training
these models for 4000 object presentations, they were famil-
iarized on the remaining six rabbits. This was done by
presenting each of the rabbits to the model repeatedly until
the output error of the hippocampal system fell below cri-
terion. The results of these simulations are shown in figure 3.
Replicating the result from [62], familiarization time to the
rabbit category was significantly shorter when the model had
previous experience with objects (including other rabbits)
than when it did not. Importantly however, when the pre-
viously experienced objects were labelled familiarization
time was again significantly shorter than when they were
merely presented without labels. This result predicts that
infants will familiarize faster to novel exemplars of familiar
objects for which they know the label than to those that are
familiar but for which the label is not known. To our knowl-
edge, this has so far not been tested with infants.
7. Discussion
In this paper, we first reviewed evidence of infant category
development as a process that is driven by infants’ emerging
abilities to integrate information about objects such as feature
correlations, dynamic and animacy cues, sounds and labels.
We then extended an artificial neural network model that
had previously been used to simulate prelingusitic category
learning to model the effect of labels on categorization. The
model suggested that labels warp the visual representational
space so that objects from the same category are represented
as more similar to each other. The model further predicts that
through the interaction between cortical and hippocampal
memory systems, knowing the label for a familiar object will
speed up familiarization to other exemplars of this object cat-
egory in looking-time tasks compared with a familiar object
for which the label is not known.
The model makes a number of contributions. First, it pro-
vides a new perspective on the debate surrounding whether
labels act as object features oras categoryplaceholders.Although
in the model shared labels increase the similarity between
objects, which has been a prediction of the label-as-feature
view, in the model the label is not a feature but acts more like a
category marker. The model, which implements the view of cat-
egory learning as a continuous process based on the progressive
enrichment of object representations ([9], see also [75]), therefore
suggests how labels as category markers, which have in exper-
imental studies been found to affect category formation, can
interact with and reorganize prelinguistic representations.
Second, the model offers an integrated view of prelinguis-
tic categorization, where it has accounted for looking time
data from infant studies and the global-to-basic shift, and
the effect of labels on categorization, where it simulates
results showing that labels can shape category structure
and that a common label makes objects appear more similar.
Several relatedmodels have addressed early categorization
and word learning. For example, a recent connectionist model
of word learning [76] consisted of two maps, one visual and
one for labels, and learning label-object mappings was
achieved by linking units between the maps. Although the
model was able to account for phenomena fromword learning
such as taxonomic responding, a vocabulary spurt and overex-
tensions, it had to make a number of assumptions that are in
contrast to empirical evidence. The model required that both
word and visual maps were fully established before mappings
between them could be formed, and the associations did not
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Figure 3. Familiarization time (measured as number of presentations until
error falls below a criterion threshold) for objects (rabbits) in three models
with different background knowledge (none; objects from all categories
without labels; objects from all categories with basic-level labels).
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affect the representations on each map. It is, however, unlikely
that infants have achieved a considerable vocabulary prior to
linking any words to objects. Furthermore, as described
above, there is considerable evidence that mappings between
objects and labels affect their representations (see also
[77,78]). This model therefore accounted neither for prelinguis-
tic categorization nor for the effect of labels on categories.
A related model [79] took the opposite label-as-feature
approach so that visual features and labels together fed into
a common category map. This model was successful in
accounting for data from the effect of labels on category for-
mation, but the dual-memory model goes beyond that model
in that it can additionally account for looking-time data in
prelinguistic categorization as well as for the global-to-basic
shift in non-familiarization-based categorization studies.
Our model is perhaps most closely related to that of
Rogers & McClelland [80]. This model maps between objects
and their perceptual and non-obvious properties. When
being trained on objects from multiple global- and basic-
level categories, the model showed a global-to-basic shift in
category differentiation as well as aspects of word learning
such as label overextensions. However, their model focused
on learning in what in our model is the cortical component
and it did not attempt to provide an integrated account of
real-world learning and online learning in looking-time
tasks. Instead it focused on those categorization studies that
do not involve familiarization. The model therefore could
not account for effects of labels on category structures
found in the described laboratory-based studies. In contrast
to our model, however, this model accounted for several
aspects of adult categorization and of semantic dementia.
Clearly, these models are complementary in the phenom-
ena they address, and an integrated model should account for
different aspects of acquisition together with normal and
impaired adult performance (for a related point, see [81]).
Furthermore, following a neuroconstructivist approach that
views typical and atypical development within the same
framework [82–84], a comprehensive model should also
aim to account for categorization in children with develop-
mental disorders. Studies on different disorders suggest
that the early processes described in this paper might be dis-
rupted, leading to cascading deficits that manifest later in life.
For example, one study with 4- to 6-year-old children with
Williams syndrome (WS) found that these children were able
to categorize objects based on similarity, but they were
unable to categorize on the basis of shared labels, despite
having developed large vocabularies [85]. This deficit to use
verbal labels as categorymarkers might itself be a downstream
consequence of WS children’s difficulty in planning visual sac-
cades and thus, triadic interactions [86]. In WS, therefore, at
least the saliency of the inputs to our model would be altered
to reduce the ability to link object representations with labels.
Evidence for atypical categorization andword learning has
also been found in studies with children with autism spectrum
disorder (ASD). Children and adults with ASD respond more
slowly to atypical category members in categorization tasks
than healthy controls do [87]. Furthermore, individuals with
ASD may have difficulty in forming prototypes when shown
varying exemplars from a category [88,89], an ability that is
already evident in typically developing three-month-olds.
These results suggest a perceptual processing deficit that
goes beyond attending to stimuli differently. In our model, cat-
egorization and prototype formation are automatic processes
that arise from the type of learning in connectionist models.
A model of categorization in autism would therefore need to
modify the central aspects of information processing in the
model. Several accounts of the observed perceptual deficits in
ASD that rely on abnormal neural processing have been put
forward that could beneficially be explored in extensions of
the current model [90–92].
Finally, children with word-finding difficulties (WFD)
present an interesting case to the model. These children have
dissociations between word comprehension and production,
with more difficulty in production compared with age-matched
peers [93]. There is a debate overwhether the core deficit inWFD
is a semantic one (such as weak links between semantically
related concepts) or a phonological one (such as impoverished
phonological representations) [93]. In our model, there are mul-
tiple loci where impairment could be simulated: sematic deficits
can arise from imprecise featural object descriptions as input to
the model or from impaired semantic processing, for example,
throughnoisy connections in thenetwork. Themost direct simu-
lation of WFD without semantic deficits would consist in
damaging connections between the cortical hidden layer and
the task/label units. The challenge is to build a developmental
model that can provide insights into whether damage to the
different parts of the model leads to performance deficits that
are comparable to those in WFD.
Our model as presented here is only the first step of an
integrated view of category and concept development. We
have focused on early categorization from two months to
around 2 years of age. However, in the transition from categ-
orization to concept formation, labels can take a role above
merely re-shaping perceptual categories. Many studies have
shown that labels can serve as the basis for inferences
about an object’s non-obvious properties where they can
override perceptual similarities ([48], e.g. [94–96]). Further-
more, recent priming studies have shown that at least from
18 months onwards there are close links between category
representations and the phonological representations of
their labels [74], as well as semantic representations and
labels [97,98]. We do not believe that our model is incompa-
tible with this research and we plan to extend it in this
direction to provide a comprehensive account from early cat-
egorization to concept formation.
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Appendix A
A.1. Model details
The model had 18 input units, 15 hidden units each and 18
output units each in the hippocampal and the cortical systems.
For the simulation inwhich global-level labelswere used it had
four task/label units, and for the simulation with basic-level
labels it had 26, one for each category. Layers were fully inter-
connected with unidirectional feed-forward connections. The
two hidden layers were fully interconnected with lateral con-
nections (i.e. the hippocampal hidden units projected into
the cortical hidden layer and vice versa). Weights were initia-
lized in the range +0.5. Training proceeded as follows: an
input was presented to the model and activation flowed to
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both hidden layers. Then, activation flowed between the
hidden layers (with inputs clamped) until a stable activation
state was reached, i.e. until the activation change for any
hidden unit was less than a threshold (0.01), or for a maximum
of 50 iterations. In the next step, activation flowed from the
hidden layers to the three output layers. Errors were computed
on all units according to the backpropagation rule. Weights
were updated with simple backpropagation with a ‘Fahl-
man-offset’ of 0.1 [99] and a momentum of 0.9. Learning
rates were as follows: in the hippocampal subsystem, 0.25;
in the cortical subsystem, 0.01; lateral connections from corti-
cal to hippocampal hidden layer, 0.1; lateral connections
from hippocampal to cortical hidden layer, 0.01; task unit
connections, 0.01.
A.2. Category structure
Category compactness was computed by calculating the
mean Euclidean distance between all members of a category
(each expressed as an 18-dimensional feature vector). These
were: female: 0.4556; male: 0.7204, dog: 0.8501; cat: 0.9072;
rabbit: 0.8001; horse: 0.8085; elephant: 0.7532; giraffe:
0.5951; cow: 0.8259; squirrel: 0.8332; fish: 0.8796; eagle:
1.3012; songbird: 0.6807; duck: 0.6756; desk: 0.4585; table:
0.2619; bed: 0.6352; sofa: 0.3459; chest of drawers: 0.6014;
chair: 0.2262; bike: 0.5659; forklift truck: 0.5128; bus: 0.4160;
car: 0.2953; plane: 0.9548; ship: 0.4402. In the interests of brev-
ity, further details of the stimulus materials have been
omitted here, but are available by request to the authors.
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